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Abstract: This paper uses a novel dataset on US food import refusals to show that reputation is an 
important factor in the enforcement of sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures. The 
strongest reputation effect comes from a country’s own history of compliance in 
relation to a particular product. The odds of at least one import refusal in the current 
year increase by over 300% if there was a refusal in the preceding year, after controlling 
for other factors. However, the data are also suggestive of the existence of two sets of 
spillovers. First, import refusals are less likely if there is an established history of 
compliance in relation to other goods in the same sector. Second, an established history 
of compliance in relation to the same product by neighboring countries also helps 
reduce the number of import refusals. These findings have important policy implications 
for exporters of agricultural products, particularly in middle-income countries. In 
particular, they highlight the importance of a comprehensive approach to upgrading 
standards systems, focusing on sectors rather than individual products, as well as the 
possible benefits that can come from regional cooperation in building SPS compliance 
capacity. 
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1 Introduction 
Non-tariff measures have become progressively more important trade policy instruments as applied 
tariff rates have fallen across the world in recent years. From a development perspective, technical 
regulations and product standards are a particularly important type of non-tariff measure because they 
highlight the fact that the favorable market access accorded under duty and quota-free preferential 
schemes remains conditional on compliance with regulations in areas such as consumer safety. Previous 
research shows that product standards and technical regulations in the large, developed markets can 
have two contradictory sets of effects for developing country exporters. On the one hand, the costs of 
compliance—retooling, product re-design, testing, and certification—can be substantial enough to keep 
many small and medium enterprises out of international markets, thereby affecting the pattern of 
international specialization (e.g., Essaji, 2008). But at the same time, foreign standards can also provide 
the impetus for firms and sectors to upgrade production technologies and realize beneficial productivity 
gains (e.g., Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). The question of which types of standards tend to promote 
which set of effects is clearly of vital policy importance to developing country exporters. The issue of 
how best to direct technical assistance resources so as to support the upgrading of standards systems 
and development of compliance mechanisms in developing countries is also an important part of 
broader Aid for Trade discussions. 
Most previous work on standards and technical regulations has focused on the rules themselves, rather 
than their design and application or enforcement through specific at-the-border mechanisms. There are 
a number of recent exceptions, however. Karov et al. (2009) focus on identifying the trade impacts of US 
phyto-sanitary regulations at the product-country level by analyzing the effects of treatment 
requirements and grants of new market access. Similarly, Alberini et al. (2005) examine implementation 
of the FDA’s seafood HACCP program using a dataset of plant inspections. Neither paper, however, deals 
with the food import refusals mechanism that is the focus of the present paper. Buzby et al. (2008) and 
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Buzby and Roberts (2010) analyze similar data on US import refusals to that used in the present paper, 
but only provide descriptive statistics. Baylis et al. (2009) is the first paper to investigate US import 
refusals empirically. In order to test whether import refusal decisions are biased, and what are the 
reasons for it, they look at a set of potential factors triggering refusals. They find that contrary to prior 
expectations, countries with experience in exporting products to the US are actually subject to relatively 
more refusals, thereby suggesting some degree of “stickiness” in the refusal determination process. 
Their findings also suggest that refusals are influenced by political pressure. 
Related work has also been conducted on European food standards. Baylis et al. (2010) use data on EU 
import alerts—closely related to refusals2—in a gravity model to show that they tend to decrease trade.3 
However, they do not examine the determinants of import refusals, and in particular the potential for 
reputation effects, which is the focus of our paper. Baylis et al. (2011) use information on EU 
notifications and find that increased use of notifications is linked with a decreased level of protection 
through tariffs. They also see that European countries that would intuitively be demanders of protection 
tend to be at the origin of more notifications than their EU partners. Finally, the first stage of the 
empirical approach taken by Cadot et al. (2009), which tests whether import alerts contribute to 
increase trade costs and thus supplier concentration, uses EU import alerts as the dependent variable, 
but the cross-sectional setting of their regressions means that they are unable to account for reputation 
effects of the type we are interested in here.  
In this paper, we use newly collected data to focus on one important example of the de facto 
implementation of product standards: refusal of entry into the US market for imported foods on safety 
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grounds. The advantage of looking at measures such as import refusals is that they are implemented on 
a country- and product-specific basis, rather than being the same de jure for all exporters. Most 
standards and regulations are effectively most-favored nation (MFN) measures, which makes it difficult 
to identify their effects on exporters by exploiting cross-country variation in outcome measures, such as 
trade flows. Focusing on a country- and product-specific measure, such as import refusals, provides a 
potentially much richer source of data in which identification can be based on cross-country as well as 
cross-product and through-time variation. 
In addition to exploiting new data on US import refusals, this paper makes a number of contributions to 
the existing literature. First, we provide some of the first explicit evidence of reputation effects in the 
enforcement of sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures. Specifically, we show that even after 
controlling for the size of import flows and other factors, a history of compliance is associated with 
fewer current import refusals. Second, we show that it is not just reputation for a particular product that 
matters, but sector-wide reputation (i.e., there are cross-product spillovers in enforcement): a product 
tends to suffer from more import refusals if closely related products are also subject to refusals. Third, 
we investigate, and find evidence to support, the hypothesis that the reputation of neighboring 
countries also matters for SPS enforcement. Our results suggest that imports are more likely to be 
refused if the same product from neighboring countries has also been subject to refusals. We interpret 
this finding as evidence in favor of geographical spillovers in enforcement of refusals. 
To our knowledge, the three reputation effects we are investigating have not been explicitly considered 
before in the literature. Baylis et al. (2009) use similar data to ours to analyze the determinants of US 
import refusals over the period 1998-2004. Their core hypotheses are that: countries with greater 
experience exporting food to the US experience fewer refusals (the “learning curve” effect); and import 
refusals are subject to political pressure (the “standards for sale” effect; cf. Grossman and Helpman, 
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1984 for the case of tariffs). The data indeed support the second hypothesis: standard political economy 
measures such as the level of lobbying activity, decreases in US employment, and anti-dumping actions 
are significantly associated with a higher number of refusals. However, the authors find that the data do 
not support their first hypothesis: more recent exporters actually face fewer refusals than established 
ones, even after controlling for export volumes. They speculate that this result may be due to a direct 
reputation effect, namely that enforcement resources tend to be concentrated on past violators. They 
do not pursue the point, but it is one that we take up here, using a different empirical specification that 
can better identify the effect, which we find to be highly significant. This paper therefore develops the 
intuition in Baylis et al. (2009) in relation to individual reputation effects, but also extends it to include 
the possibility of reputational spillovers from related products and sectors. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide an outline of the US import refusals 
regime. Based on that description, Section 3 presents our dataset, focusing on the new import refusals 
data. We present some preliminary analysis that supports our hypotheses using descriptive statistical 
techniques, then proceed to develop a fully-specified econometric model of import refusals. Section 4 
presents and discusses the results from our model, and conducts robustness checks. Section 5 concludes 
with a discussion of policy implications, and avenues for further research. 
2 The US Import Refusals Regime 
To gain admission to the US market, imported foods must meet SPS requirements applying to the 
product and country of origin. Broadly speaking, SPS measures are aimed at safeguarding the US market 
from both sanitary risks (the cause of food-borne human illnesses and animal diseases) and phyto-
sanitary risks (vectors of transmission of plant pests and diseases). 
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Phyto-sanitary standards mean for fresh fruits and vegetables that they must be free of pests and 
diseases when entering the US. Exporters must meet a complex set of regulations, compiled in the Fresh 
Fruit and Vegetables Import Requirements (FAVIR) online database. Compliance with these regulations 
is overseen and administered by the US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS).4 
In this paper we focus on US sanitary measures. Food products can be the source of numerous food-
borne illnesses (due to pathogens, toxins, and chemicals). All food products must be unadulterated (not 
bear or contain any poisonous or deleterious substances), be fit for consumption, and not contaminated 
or decaying, in order to be allowed for consumption in the U.S. At the federal level, there are three 
agencies involved in the oversight of food and food ingredients safety: the US Department of 
Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). FSIS ensures the safety of imported meats, poultry, and 
processed egg products. FDA covers all other products. EPA licenses pesticide products and monitors 
pesticide residues in products.  
The FDA enforces the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FD&C) as well as other laws designed to 
protect consumer health, welfare, and safety. Under Sec. 801 of FD&C, products are subject to 
inspection when imported. Imported food products are expected to meet the same standards as 
domestic products, i.e. they must be pure, wholesome, safe to eat, and produced under sanitary 
conditions. Food imports must also contain informative and truthful labeling in English.5  
Another important requirement is that since 1997, producers must follow FDA's good agricultural 
practices (GAP) for the control and management of microbial food safety. Likewise, since 1995 fish 
products imports must meet hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) standards, as must 
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 For an overview of the US fruit and vegetable protection system, see Jouanjean et al. (2011). 
5
 http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/ImportProgram/ImportProgramOverview/default.htm  
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domestic producers. Other measures applying to seafood include traceability requirements such as the 
identity preservation system for molluscans, and labeling of origin and method of production (wild 
harvest or farm raised).  
Other programs concerning food products in general are also in place such as the acidified and low acid 
canned foods regulations. Acidified and Low Acid Canned Foods must be manufactured in accordance 
with FDA regulations. Food canning establishments must also register with the FDA.  
All the measures described above are defined on the principle of national treatment: importers and 
domestic producers are subject to exactly the same requirements. There is however a significant 
difference in de facto treatment between domestic goods and imported products with respect to food 
safety: the Act allows for refusal of imported FDA-regulated products for “appearing” to be adulterated 
or misbranded. The law is interpreted in a broad sense as allowing the FDA to make admissibility 
decisions based not only on physical evidence such as examination, facility inspection, or laboratory 
results, but also based on historical data, information from other sources (e.g. about a disease 
outbreak), labeling, and any other evidence.6 Factors such as reputation can clearly come into play in 
this decision. In other words, if there is a suspicion that a product from a given origin will not meet FDA 
standards, it can be detained. Therefore the standard of proof for determination of refusal for food 
import products is much less strict than for domestic products, which must be based on an actual 
violation. Therefore we can form the hypothesis that refusals may be partly path-dependent (as noted 
by Baylis et al., 2009) since past histories of violation from similar products and origins are criteria that 
may be used to decide whether there is a suspicion of adulteration or misbranding, which can in turn 
justify a refusal. 
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 Presentation by Domenic Veneziano, Director, FDA Division of Import Operations at the Food & Agriculture 
Border Gateway Summit January 16, 2008. 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mda/FDA_importproc_224440_7.pdf accessed 22 November 2011. 
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Baylis et al. (2009) explain that this looser requirement may be motivated by the fact that the FDA has 
less easy access to means of verification for imported products: for instance, until the 2011 Food Safety 
Modernization Act, the FDA had no extra-territorial jurisdiction and was not able to inspect foreign 
plants or to require third party certifications. Therefore, until 2011, the FDA had to rely primarily on 
resource intensive port-of-entry inspections.7 The rapid increase in imports of FDA-regulated goods, 
from six million shipments a decade ago to 24 million in 2011, ultimately motivated a risk-based 
approach to inspections at the border, which helps optimize the staff and equipment resources needed 
for the physical inspection of products and facilitate trade by limiting the costs in lost time and spoiled 
products for the exporter (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2011). 
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, the FDA 
issued regulations in December 2003 requiring two things: 1) that food facilities (including foreign) are 
registered with the FDA; and 2) FDA be given advanced notice of shipments of imported food. The 
information required for prior notice varies, based on the type of entry, mode of transportation for 
entry, and whether the food is in its natural state. Upon reviewing the notice, the FDA can decide to 
release the product, request additional information or documents, request physical examination of the 
product, or recommend detention of the product. Detention means that in the absence of petition or 
reconditioning of the goods from the exporter, the product will not be released into US territory and will 
either be re-exported or destroyed within approximately 90 days. 
Physical examination entails verification of labeling, of the container integrity, sampling, and 
verification, and leads to either a recommendation of release or detention. According to the literature, 
                                                          
7
 Until the 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act, the FDA’s primary tools for product safety and quality have been 
inspections at production facilities and ports of entry. The large increase in imports has outrun FDA resources and 
the inspection rate dropped from 8% in 1992 to less than 2% in 2011 (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2011; 
U.S. Congress of the U.S., 2011; Schmit, 2007; and U.S. GAO, 2001). Because of this rapid increase in FDA-regulated 
imports, the FDA acknowledges that resource constraints are its chief concern.  
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about 1-2% of all food shipments are subject to physical examination by FDA, and a fraction of these are 
subject to sampling (Buzby et al., 2009; Baylis et al., 2009). 
The FDA relies on a system of alerts for particularly sensitive categories of products in order to help it 
save and allocate inspection resources. Alerts are issued when the FDA determines that there is a 
particular risk associated with a product, producer/exporter, country or region of origin. In most 
circumstances, alerts determine that firms and products identified are subject to detention without 
physical examination (DWPE). In this case, the FDA automatically detains the concerned products until it 
is demonstrated that the violation has been remedied. Therefore the burden of proof falls on the 
importer or shipper, or the manufacturer/grower of the product. As noted by Baylis et al. (2009) alerts 
are strikingly rarely changed: three quarters of alerts in place in 2009 had been in place for more than 10 
years, and a significant portion of them (one quarter of all alerts) for more than 20 years. 
Alerts appear to be decided on similar legal basis to refusals, e.g. the standard of “appearance”. 
According to the FDA, alerts are triggered by historical violations at the following levels: commodities; 
manufacturers/shippers; growers; importers; geographic area; and countries of origin.8 Sources of 
information come from FDA’s own field offices, but also foreign inspections and evidence from other 
countries. 
3 Methodology and Data 
As the above discussion demonstrates, US border authorities exercise broad discretions when 
implementing the import refusals regime. As previously noted by Baylis et al. (2009), and as suggested 
by the FDA itself, there is a strong possibility of path dependence: the authorities might look at historical 
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 Presentation by Domenic Veneziano, Director, FDA Division of Import Operations at the Food & Agriculture 
Border Gateway Summit January 16, 2008. 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mda/FDA_importproc_224440_7.pdf accessed 22 November 2011. 
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patterns of compliance in allocating scarce enforcement resources, leading to a correlation between 
past and present import refusals, even after controlling for other factors. We refer to this as the “own 
reputation” effect. In addition, the structure of the US import refusals system is suggestive of two other 
effects that might be in operation. One is a “sector reputation” effect, by which we mean the possibility 
that import refusals for a particular product are associated with past import refusals affecting closely 
related products. The second is a “neighbor reputation” effect, namely the possibility that import 
refusals affecting a given product from one country might be more likely if neighboring exporters of the 
same product have a history of non-compliance. In the remainder of this section, we outline the data 
and model we will use to test for the existence of all three effects.   
3.1 US Import Refusals Data 
This paper uses a new dataset of US import refusals for the period 1998-2008. It extends the data used 
in Jouanjean (2011), and covers HS chapters 3 (fish and crustaceans), 7 (vegetables), 8 (fruits), 9 (coffee, 
tea, mate, and spices), 16 (preparations of meat, fish, and crustaceans), and 20 (preparations of 
vegetables, fruits, and nuts). The reason for focusing on these sectors is that they correspond to FDA 
Industry Codes 16 (fishery and seafood products), 20-22 (fruit and fruit products), and 24-25 (vegetables 
and vegetable products). Refusals in these sectors accounted for over 50% of all FDA import violations 
over the 1998-2004 period (Buzby et al., 2008). We are therefore confident that by focusing on these 
three sectors, we are capturing an important part of overall import refusal activity in the US. This 
subsection describes the US import refusals regime in more detail, focusing on the way in which the 
data used here were collected. 
Since 1998, the FDA has implemented an automatic system governing the admission process for FDA-
regulated shipments of foreign-origin products presented for entry into the US. The system, known as 
the “Operational and Administrative System for Import Support” or OASIS, is designed to simplify 
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operations and reduce the time taken for clearance of shipments. It classifies imported items into 
different risk categories by tracking historical data on shipments that were previously refused admission 
into the US. Again, this process is suggestive of path dependence and reputation effects of the type that 
are the focus of this paper. 
The FDA makes refusals information public in their Import Refusal Report (IRR), which is generated from 
OASIS data. Reports provide information on the manufacturer’s name and country of origin, as well as 
the dates and motives for the refusal. To gain access to historical refusals data, we submitted a Freedom 
of Information Act request in September 2009, which the FDA satisfied by supplying data in May 2010.  
Product codes supplied by the exporter allow for a very specific definition of the transformation process 
the imported product has undergone (raw, dried, and pasteurized etc.) and it is usually precise enough 
to define a straightforward correspondence with the HS classification. The only part of the 
correspondence in which additional issues arise involves the FDA process code relating to “packaged 
food” under which exporters/importers tend to regroup various types of products that sometimes 
should have been coded otherwise. Thus, more careful handling was necessary. First, according to 
product subclasses providing information on containers, we make the straightforward assumption that 
products in metal and glass containers are transformed, and thus fall into HS Chapter 16 for “fish and 
fishery products”, and HS Chapter 20 for “fruit and fruit products”, and “vegetables and vegetable 
products”. Second, for containers of different materials, we analyzed product description data in which 
the FDA agent filled in a precise definition of the product. We also verified the information about 
refused products on companies’ websites. 
3.2 Other Data 
In addition to the novel dataset on FDA import refusals discussed in the previous subsection, we use 
standard data sources for the remaining variables used in our analysis (Table 1). We source trade data 
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from UN-Comtrade, accessed via the World Bank’s WITS platform. We use US import data for 1998-2008 
at the HS four-digit level, including all exporting countries. In light of the high quality of US import data, 
we replace all missing values with zero to indicate that no trade took place for the given exporter-
product-year combination. We only include trade data for which we have corresponding refusals data, 
namely HS chapters 3, 7, 8, 9, 16, and 20 from which we exclude nuts and meat preparations since those 
products belong to other FDA industry codes not analyzed in this paper. In addition to trade data to 
control for imports, we source per capita GDP data in PPP terms from the World Development 
Indicators. Finally, we include US effectively applied import tariffs as an additional explanatory variable. 
These data are sourced from UNCTAD’s TRAINS database via the World Bank’s WITS platform. Since 
many missing values are returned, we use the world average by product-year combination when data on 
effectively applied import tariffs are unavailable on a bilateral basis. 
3.3 Preliminary Analysis 
Before moving to a fully-specified econometric model, it is useful to examine some simple correlations 
in the data to see whether they support our three hypotheses, namely the own reputation effect, the 
sector reputation effect, and the neighbor reputation effect. As outlined above, we expect to see 
positive associations between, on the one hand, the number of refusals for a given country-product-year 
combination, and, on the other, the number of refusals affecting that country-product combination in 
the previous year (own reputation), the number of refusals affecting related products—those in the 
same HS2 chapter—from the same country in the previous year (sector reputation), and the number of 
refusals affecting the same product from related countries—the five geographically closest to the 
exporter—in the previous year (neighbor reputation). For ease of presentation we convert the variables 
to logarithms to reduce dispersion.  
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In all three cases (Figures 1-3), the data provide support for our propositions. The positive association is 
strongest, as would be expected, in the case of own reputation (Figure 1). Although the correlations in 
Figures 2 and 3, which capture reputational spillover effects, are weaker, they are nonetheless positive 
and 1% statistically significant. In terms of slope coefficients, the stronger gradient of the line of best fit 
in Figure 3 than in Figure 2 provides some preliminary evidence that neighbor reputation may be 
quantitatively more important than sector reputation. 
Of course, the graphical analysis we have presented is based on simple correlations only. It does not 
take account of intervening influences. To address this issue more fully, the next subsection develops an 
econometric model, for which we report estimation results in the next section.  
3.4 Empirical Model 
As discussed above, we are primarily interested in assessing the impact of reputation effects in the 
enforcement of US SPS regulations through import refusals. We use two dependent variables. The first, 
, is a dummy variable equal to unity if a country-HS four-digit product-year 
combination has at least one import refusal. The second, , is a count of the number of 
import refusals affecting a particular exporter-product-year combination. We use similar sets of 
independent variables in both cases, but estimate the first model using a conditional fixed effects logit 
estimator, and the second using a negative binomial estimator. 
As independent variables, we include three measures of reputation. The first, “own reputation”, is 
simply the lagged dependent variable, i.e. a dummy equal to one if there was at least one refusal in the 
preceding year, or a count of the number of refusals affecting a given exporter-product combination in 
the previous year. The second, “sector reputation”, is a lagged dummy equal to unity if there was at 
least one refusal affecting products in the same HS two-digit chapter from a given exporter, but 
excluding the number of refusals affecting the product in question, or a similarly defined count variable. 
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It is therefore a measure of the extent to which related products are subject to import refusals. The 
third variable, “neighbor reputation”, is a lagged dummy equal to unity if there is at least one refusal 
affecting the same product exported from geographically close countries, or the corresponding count 
variable. We define “closeness” using geodesic distance as the benchmark, i.e. the five closest countries 
to the exporter. If reputation effects are present in the data, we expect all three of these variables to 
have positive and statistically significant coefficients. 
It is also important to ensure that we control for other possible influences on the number of import 
refusals. The lagged level of imports is an obvious control to include, since more exports should be 
associated with a greater number of refusals. We use import values in levels, rather than taking 
logarithms, to ensure that observations with zero trade are retained in the estimation sample. 
We also include effectively applied tariffs as a control variable, with missing values interpolated as 
discussed above. The rationale for including tariffs is a political economy one. Although the import 
refusals regime is designed to safeguard consumer safety, it is plausible that the influence of industry 
lobbies might result in more refusals than simple safety concerns might dictate. If such political 
economy forces are at work, we would expect to see a positive correlation between tariffs and import 
refusals, i.e. more refusals in more heavily protected sectors. 
In addition to import values and tariffs, we also control for the logarithm of the exporting country’s per 
capita GDP. We use this measure as a proxy for the exporter’s level of financial and technical capacity, 
which is an important determinant of its ability to comply with foreign standards. In subsequent 
regressions, we estimate using separate sub-samples for different World Bank income groups to allow 
for more complex income effects in the determination of import refusals. 
To take account of additional country-, product-, and time-specific factors, we also include full sets of 
fixed effects in those three dimensions. Product fixed effects—which are specified at the HS four-digit 
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level—are of particular importance, because they allow us to control for the inherent riskiness of 
particular products, which is likely to lead to a greater rate of inspections and refusals. 
Bringing these points together allows us to specify our baseline models, using the two dependent 
variables (dummy and count): 
 
 
where  indicates fixed effects in the exporter (i), product (k), and time (t) dimensions. As noted above, 
equation (1) is estimated as a conditional fixed effects logit model, and equation (2) is estimated as a 
fixed effects negative binomial model. 
16 
 
4 Estimation Results and Discussion 
4.1 Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Results 
Table 2 presents results using the dummy variable  as the dependent variable. The 
baseline model is in column 1. Our main variables of interest, the three reputation dummies, are all 
positively signed and one percent statistically significant. Converting the estimated parameters to odds 
ratios by exponentiation suggests that the effects are also highly economically significant. For example, 
the odds of receiving at least one import refusal in a given year increase by about 340% if there was at 
least one refusal in the previous year, after controlling for other factors. As expected, the other two 
reputation effects are weaker, but still highly significant. An import refusal affecting other products in 
the same HS two-digit chapter increases the odds of a refusal by 62%, and an import refusal affecting 
the same product exported by neighboring countries increases the odds of a refusal by 110%. These 
results clearly suggest that reputation matters in the enforcement of US SPS regulations through the 
import refusals system, and that it is not just a country’s reputation for a particular product that 
matters, but its track record with similar products, and even the track record of neighboring countries. 
Turning to the control variables, we also find signs and magnitudes that accord with intuition, and 
parameters that are one percent statistically significant in all but one case. As expected, a higher level of 
imports is associated with a greater probability of suffering at least one refusal. Interestingly, the tariff 
rate is also positively associated with the probability of refusal: US authorities are more likely to issue 
refusals affecting products that are relatively strongly protected as opposed to those with lower tariff 
rates. This finding could be consistent with the influence of political economy forces in the 
implementation of US SPS measures through the refusals system. Although further work would be 
necessary to confirm that this is the case, the association we have found here is nonetheless striking. 
Finally, the coefficient on per capita income is negative, which is in line with expectations: richer 
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countries with presumably more developed SPS infrastructure are less likely to suffer import refusals. 
However, the effect is not statistically significant. The influence of country income on refusal behavior is 
something we discuss in more detail below. 
The remaining columns of Table 2 use alternative specifications to ensure that our initial results are 
robust. In columns 2 and 3, we change the definition of “neighboring” countries to be respectively the 
three closest countries and the overall closest countries. As can be seen from the table, our finding on 
the important of neighborhood reputation is robust to the first change, but the neighborhood 
reputation variable becomes statistically insignificant in the final case. What matters from a reputational 
point of view is therefore a country’s geographical region in broad terms, not just the behavior of its 
closest neighbor.  
As an additional check, column 4 of Table 2 limits the sample to those partner country-product 
combinations for which at least some trade is observed during the sample period. The rationale behind 
this limitation is that the refusals regime only affects actual or potential exporters,9 but the sample used 
for the baseline model includes a large number of data points where no trade is taking place. In any 
case, little turns on this sampling issue in practice. Column 4 shows that even though the sample size is 
reduced by about 45% due to this restriction, the estimated coefficients remain very close to the 
baseline in sign, significance, and magnitude. 
Finally, column 5 uses a distributed lag model to examine the possibility that reputation effects are more 
persistent over time than the baseline model allows for by only using one lag. We consider three lags of 
each of the reputation variables, and find that they are positively signed and one percent statistically 
significant in all but two cases (the second and third lags of the sector reputation dummy). As might be 
expected, these results suggest that reputation is sticky, in the sense that it changes only slowly over 
                                                          
9
 For some sectors in our sample, this number is also a good proxy for the set of countries allowed access to the US 
market under the SPS regime. 
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time. Converting the parameters to odds ratios again suggests that an import refusal three years ago 
increases the odds of a refusal in the current period by 107%. The corresponding numbers are smaller 
for neighborhood reputation (22%) but is still economically significant. 
To provide some further detail on the baseline results, Table 3 presents regression results for sub-
samples limited by World Bank geographical region. Moving across the table, it is clear that for all 
regions except Sub-Saharan Africa, own reputation is a significant determinant of the likelihood of an 
import refusal: the coefficient is positively signed and at least 5% statistically significant. Comparing the 
magnitude of the coefficient across specifications suggests that the effect is particularly strong for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, which is an important exporter of agricultural products to the USA.  
Similarly, the sector reputation effect also has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all 
regions except Sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, however, the effect is strongest in the South Asia region. 
By contrast, results for the neighbor reputation variable are more mixed. The coefficient is only positive 
and statistically significant for four of the six regions: Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Table 4 expands on these results by considering samples limited to individual World Bank income 
groups. The own reputation variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all three 
regressions, but its magnitude is much larger in the case of high- and middle-income countries (columns 
1-2) than in that of low-income countries (column 3). By contrast, the sector reputation variable only has 
a statistically significant coefficient for high- and middle-income countries, and the effect is noticeably 
stronger in the latter case. In line with this result, neighborhood reputation has a statistically significant 
coefficient in all three regressions, but its magnitude is much stronger for low- and particularly middle-
income countries than for high-income countries.  
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Together, these results tend to suggest that the reputation effects we have identified may act as a 
particularly significant barrier to market access for middle-income countries—exactly the group that 
contains a number of important agricultural exporters, such as Brazil and South Africa. One possibility is 
that trade flows from low income countries are too small to attract the attention of the refusals system, 
and it is only once some threshold is passed that reputation begins to play a significant role in the 
issuance of refusals. Overall, the lack of significance of the reputation variables for low income countries 
and Sub-Saharan Africa does not come as too much of a surprise. Exports to the US from countries 
belonging to those groups are highly irregular, which affects the significance of the own reputation and 
neighbor reputation variables, and are concentrated on a small subset of food products, which affects 
the sector reputation variable. In any case, our results clearly demonstrate that enforcement of the US 
SPS regime through import refusals can have important development policy implications, a point that 
has previously been noted in the literature on standards and trade, where differential impacts by 
country income group have also been identified (e.g., Disdier et al., 2008). 
To provide further detail on our results, Table 5 provides separate estimations for each HS 2-digit sector, 
excluding sector 9 (coffee, tea, mate, and spices) due to too few observations. The own reputation 
effect has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all but one regression (preparations of 
meat, fish, and crustaceans). The neighborhood reputation coefficient is positive and 1% statistically 
significant in all regressions. Comparing magnitudes across the columns in Table 5 suggests that the own 
reputation effect is particularly important in vegetables, as well as fruits and nuts, and fish and 
crustaceans. The neighborhood reputation effect is particularly strong, by contrast, in fruits, 
preparations of meat, fish, and crustaceans, and preparations of vegetables and fruits. In terms of the 
control variables, the value of imports has a positive coefficient in all regressions, which is statistically 
significant in three cases. The relationship between tariffs and refusals is similarly positive and 
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statistically significant in two cases. There is only one case in which per capita income has a statistically 
significant coefficient, and it is negative, as expected. 
The only result that needs significant explanation in Table 5 relates to the sector reputation variables. 
Contrary to expectations, they have coefficients that are negative and statistically significant. The reason 
for this undoubtedly lies in the structure of the regressions. By limiting each one to a single two digit 
sector, the sector reputation variable becomes very closely correlated with the country fixed effects: it is 
only to the extent that the sector reputation dummy varies over time that it can be separately 
identified. Since, as we have noted above, there is considerable persistence in the reputation variables, 
it is likely that this correlation drives the unexpected results we observe on this variable. 
4.2 Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Results 
The regression results discussed in the previous section were all based on a conditional fixed effects 
logit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to unity in the case of at least one import 
refusal for a given exporter-product-year combination. In this section, we use a different dependent 
variable, namely a count of the number of import refusals per exporter-product-year combination. This 
approach allows us to introduce more nuance into the dependent variable, and ensure that our results 
are robust to this alternative measure. 
Table 6 presents results using equation (2) estimated as a negative binomial regression, which we prefer 
to the Poisson estimator due to likely over-dispersion in the data. Each column corresponds to a similar 
logit model in Table 2. Results between the two sets of specifications are very similar in qualitative 
terms. In all five models in Table 5, the coefficient on own reputation is positive and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. The same is true of the sector reputation and neighborhood 
reputation coefficients, including in the last case all the five and three country definitions of 
neighborhood, but not the nearest neighbor definition. It makes very little difference whether all trade 
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relationships are included in the sample (column 1), or only those with some positive trade during the 
sample period (column 4). When a distributed lag specification is used (column 5), we again find 
substantial evidence that reputation is sticky: the coefficients on all variables except the second and 
third lags of sector reputation and the third lag of neighborhood reputation are positive and at least five 
percent statistically significant.  
Among the control variables, results are in line with those from the logit models. Import value has the 
expected positive and statistically significant coefficient in all cases. The same is true of tariffs, which 
supports the potential political economy dynamic referred to above. Per capita income again has the 
expected negative coefficient, but it is not statistically significant. 
We can use the estimated coefficients from the negative binomial model to give a more detailed 
quantitative interpretation to our results. For example, the coefficient on own reputation implies that 
one additional import refusal in the preceding year is associated with an increase of about five percent 
in the number of refusals for the current year. The effects for sector reputation and neighborhood 
reputation are weaker, but still economically significant, at 0.4% and 1.2% respectively. These findings 
reinforce the conclusions of the logit model, in which we also found that it is primarily own reputation 
that matters for the probability of suffering at least one import refusal, but that neighborhood 
reputation and, to a lesser extent, sector reputation also matter. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has produced some of the first direct evidence and quantification that reputation effects 
matter in the enforcement of US SPS measures through the import refusals system. Specifically, 
countries with a history of compliance tend to experience fewer refusals, even after controlling for other 
factors.  
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As modern border controls, including SPS ones, increasingly rely on risk-based approaches (Widdowson 
and Holloway, 2011), one should expect certain categories of exports to build a higher risk profile than 
others and thus be subject to higher levels of controls and thus detection of non-compliance. Risk-based 
methods are, however, not very transparent in the methodology they use—presumably to avoid 
circumventing tactics by traders—and may create unnecessary uncertainty for traders. A natural 
candidate determinant for shipments presenting a higher risk of non-compliance is past history of 
compliance, which our research shows is indeed the case. 
In addition, and more surprisingly, countries with a history of compliance in related products also tend 
to experience fewer current refusals, as do countries whose neighbors have an established history of 
compliance. We interpret these last two effects as evidence of reputational spillovers in the 
enforcement of SPS rules. 
Although more research is clearly needed in a number of areas—more on this below—some important 
policy implications would seem to follow from our findings. First, exporters of agricultural products 
seeking to break into the US market need to focus on building SPS capacity so as to become reliable 
sources. It is not sufficient to export a mix of compliant and non-compliant goods: reputation matters, 
and the presence of the latter will make it harder to get the former into the market as well. Consistency 
and reliability of production are therefore key issues in the development of SPS capacity in agricultural 
exporters, and particularly in middle-income countries that have the potential to be significant 
competitors for US production. 
Since we capture our effects at the product and country level, our findings also have implications for the 
need for producers and exporters wishing to sell in the US market to organize themselves in order to 
enforce sanitary compliance: indeed if one rogue exporter triggers a refusal, the risks of subsequent 
future refusals on others increases. More generally, this finding is in line with the observation that SPS 
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measures tend to require strong sectoral organization on the part of the exporters (see also Jouanjean 
et al., 2011). 
Second, our results strongly suggest that a comprehensive approach to SPS compliance is likely to be 
more effective than a piecemeal one. Although it might seem sensible to concentrate limited SPS 
capacity building resources on a small number of products that are individually important, such an 
approach neglects the importance of the sectoral spillover effects evident in our data. Building capacity 
across the sector as a whole can have important benefits for individual products. 
Similarly, the likelihood that regional reputation matters for SPS enforcement also has important policy 
implications. Regional approaches to the development of standards systems are becoming more 
common for many reasons, such as the ability for small, poor countries to pool technical and financial 
resources (Maur and Shepherd, 2011). Our findings suggest an additional reason for encouraging 
regional standards cooperation: geographical spillovers mean that compliance by a country’s neighbors 
can help it achieve more effective market access. 
Currently, there is only a very small literature examining SPS measures at the level of enforcement 
mechanisms, such as alerts or import refusals. Further work in this area has the potential to bring 
significant insights into the workings of product standards more generally, and in particular their effects 
on developing country exporters. Baylis et al. (2009) make a first attempt to assess the trade impacts of 
import refusals. Extending their work to take account of the types of reputation spillover effects we 
have identified here could be a fruitful avenue for future research. Our own work highlights the need to 
treat import refusals as endogenous in gravity model settings, which is an important dimension in which 
the robustness of previous assessments needs to be established. Similarly, Baylis et al. (2009) provide 
some initial evidence suggesting that political economy forces may be relevant in determining the 
application of SPS measures. Since almost nothing is known about the political economy determinants 
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of product standards (c.f. Kono, 2006), this too would be an interesting research question to pursue 
using data similar to those we have used here. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Data and sources. 
Variable Description Year Source 
 Per capita GDP of country i in year t (in PPP terms). 1998-
2008. 
World 
Development 
Indicators. 
 Imports of product k from country i in year t, in quantity terms (not value). 1998-
2008. 
UN Comtrade via 
WITS. 
 Number of import refusals affecting product k exported from country i in year t. 1998-
2008. 
Authors. 
 Dummy variable equal to unity if . 1998-
2008. 
Authors. 
 Number of import refusals affecting products other than product k in the same HS 
two-digit sector, from country i in year t. 
1998-
2008. 
Authors. 
 Dummy variable equal to unity if . 1998-
2008. 
Authors. 
 Number of import refusals affecting product k exported by country i’s neighboring 
countries in year t. Neighboring countries are defined alternately as the five closest 
neighbors, the three closest neighbors, and the closest neighbor. 
1998-
2008. 
Authors. 
 Dummy variable equal to unity if . 1998-
2008. 
Authors. 
 Effectively applied US tariff on product k from country i in year t. 1998-
2008. 
UNCTAD Trains via 
WITS. 
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Table 2: Logit regression results. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Baseline Neighborhood 3 Neighborhood 1 Imports > 0 Lags 
 
1.478*** 1.354*** 1.729*** 1.455*** 1.145*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
    
0.725*** 
     
(0.000) 
 
    
0.726*** 
     
(0.000) 
 
0.484*** 0.497*** 0.511*** 0.419*** 0.357*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
    
0.084 
     
(0.250) 
 
    
-0.044 
     
(0.542) 
 
0.744*** 
  
0.650*** 0.507*** 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
    
0.307*** 
     
(0.000) 
 
    
0.199*** 
     
(0.009) 
 
 
0.729*** 
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(0.000) 
    
  
0.231 
  
   
(0.232) 
   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 4.016*** 4.190*** 4.317*** 3.833*** 3.374*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) 
 -0.062 -0.097 -0.092 -0.015 -0.117 
 
(0.822) (0.723) (0.727) (0.956) (0.720) 
Pseudo-R2 0.476 0.474 0.472 0.387 0.496 
Observations 54760 54760 54760 29839 54760 
The dependent variable is  and estimation is by conditional fixed effects logit in all cases. All models include fixed effects by 
partner country, HS four-digit product, and year. Prob. values based on robust standard errors corrected for clustering by partner country are in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
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Table 3: Logit regression results by World Bank region. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Europe & Central 
Asia 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
Middle East 
&  
North Africa 
South 
Asia 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
0.988*** 0.684** 1.514*** 1.266*** 0.904*** 0.355 
 
(0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.268) 
 
0.678*** 0.688*** 0.325** 0.526** 0.964*** 0.340 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.041) (0.033) (0.000) (0.370) 
 
0.157 0.848*** 0.484*** 0.554** -0.368 0.660* 
 
(0.539) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.588) (0.056) 
 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.449) (0.001) (0.161) (0.000) (0.008) 
 6.251*** -0.924 -6.647* 13.209*** 4.591 -6.645 
 
(0.000) (0.767) (0.054) (0.000) (0.170) (0.362) 
 -0.441 1.394 0.335 1.846 -3.417* -3.046* 
 
(0.470) (0.205) (0.627) (0.349) (0.060) (0.093) 
Pseudo-R2 0.659 0.443 0.428 0.404 0.498 0.332 
Observations 4092 3564 10725 2310 1612 6534 
The dependent variable is  and estimation is by conditional fixed effects logit in all cases. All models include fixed effects by 
partner country, HS four-digit product, and year. Prob. values based on robust standard errors corrected for clustering by partner country are in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
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Table 4: Logit regression results by World Bank income group. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
High Income Middle Income Low Income 
 
1.474*** 1.431*** 0.947*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
0.393*** 0.528*** -0.068 
 
(0.004) (0.000) (0.807) 
 
0.416*** 0.865*** 0.769*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.284) (0.000) (0.001) 
 2.520 4.889** 4.348*** 
 
(0.254) (0.022) (0.004) 
 -0.305 0.309 -3.297*** 
 
(0.607) (0.446) (0.002) 
Pseudo-R2 0.447 0.478 0.514 
Observations 16224 28600 6664 
The dependent variable is  and estimation is by conditional fixed effects logit in all cases. All models include fixed effects by 
partner country, HS four-digit product, and year. Prob. values based on robust standard errors corrected for clustering by partner country are in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
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Table 5: Logit regression results by HS 2-digit sector. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Fish & Crustaceans Vegetables Fruits 
Preparations of Fish & 
Crustaceans 
Preparations of Vegetables & 
Fruits 
 
1.300*** 1.586*** 1.399*** 0.199 0.761*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.304) (0.000) 
 
-0.426*** -0.573*** -0.560*** -0.638*** -0.268** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.033) 
 
0.470*** 0.540*** 0.635*** 0.660*** 0.610*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) 
 0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 
 
(0.175) (0.091) (0.002) (0.340) (0.024) 
 -0.644 5.375** 7.537*** -4.281 -0.047 
 
(0.943) (0.031) (0.000) (0.492) (0.977) 
 -0.526 -1.049* 0.790 -0.245 0.420 
 
(0.409) (0.071) (0.243) (0.853) (0.510) 
Pseudo-R2 0.423 0.402 0.400 0.395 0.422 
Observations 5055 9659 8420 1826 9009 
The dependent variable is  and estimation is by conditional fixed effects logit in all cases. All models include fixed effects by 
partner country, HS four-digit product, and year. Prob. values based on robust standard errors corrected for clustering by partner country are in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
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Table 6: Negative binomial regression results. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Baseline Neighborhood 3 Neighborhood 1 Imports > 0 Lags 
 
0.048*** 0.048*** 0.058*** 0.047*** 0.037*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
    
0.012*** 
     
(0.000) 
 
    
0.012*** 
     
(0.000) 
 
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
    
-0.001 
     
(0.567) 
 
    
0.001 
     
(0.135) 
 
0.012*** 
  
0.011*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
    
0.006** 
     
(0.032) 
 
    
-0.002 
     
(0.410) 
 
 
0.014*** 
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(0.000) 
    
  
0.006 
  
   
(0.268) 
   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 4.792*** 4.904*** 4.867*** 4.296*** 4.633*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
 -0.159 -0.171 -0.145 -0.139 -0.221 
 
(0.695) (0.679) (0.720) (0.740) (0.604) 
R2 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.043 0.016 
Observations 88458 88458 88458 38131 88458 
The dependent variable is  and estimation is by fixed effects negative binomial in all cases. All models include fixed effects by partner 
country, HS four-digit product, and year. Prob. values based on robust standard errors corrected for clustering by partner country are in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). R2 is calculated as the square of the correlation coefficient 
between actual and fitted values. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Current vs. lagged import refusals. 
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Figure 2: Refusals versus lagged refusals affecting similar products (same HS2 group). 
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Figure 3: Refusals vs. lagged refusals affecting the five closest countries. 
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